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OCI No. 0508/66

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**BIWEEKLY REPORT**

**COMMUNIST STATEMENTS REGARDING INTERVENTION  
IN VIETNAM AND POSSIBLE NEGOTIATIONS**

**15 April 1966**

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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-  
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES  
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,  
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-  
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO  
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Washington 25, D. C.  
15 April 1966

**MEMORANDUM**

Attached is a compilation of Communist statements on possible direct military intervention in the Vietnam situation, and on possible negotiations toward a settlement, received since our last biweekly report (OCI No. 0507/66) issued 30 March 1966.

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SUMMARY

NEGOTIATIONS

USSR The occasion of the 23rd Soviet party Congress brought no change in Moscow's position on the question of negotiations.

China Peking continues to oppose any negotiated settlement of the Vietnam problem except on the Communist terms.

DRV Hanoi used the first anniversary of the promulgation of its four-point proposal for settling the war to demonstrate that in the intervening year its position on settling the war had not budged. Articles on the occasion restated the original four-points verbatim and asserted once again that the US must accept them all and prove it by "concrete deeds" before any settlement of the Vietnam war can be envisaged.

INTERVENTION

During the Congress Soviet speakers reiterated well-worn public expressions of support for the DRV, giving no indication of any change in Moscow's previous stance.

Chinese statements continue to imply that there will be no Sino-US war unless the US attacks China. In private conversations with Pakistani leaders, Liu Shao-chi reiterated Peking's pledge first made publicly last spring to provide troops if requested by Hanoi.

While Hanoi has made no significant statements on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks, it has replayed statements by Soviet officials at the 23rd Congress of the CPSU pledging volunteers when the North Vietnamese deem them "necessary."

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NEGOTIATIONS

NFLSV There have been no significant statements by the Front of the subject of negotiations during the past two weeks. All indications suggest however, that the Front's position on settling the war has not changed.

INTERVENTION

The Liberation Front has made no significant statements on the subject of intervention during the past two weeks.

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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Intervention

<u>Selected Soviet Public Statements</u>	<u>Selected Soviet Private Statements</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2 April 1966: Foreign Minister Gromyko reiterated General-Secretary Brezhnev's statement before the Congress a few days earlier that the Soviet Union "will render ever increasing support to Vietnam," and added this "must be taken seriously" by those who "unleashed" the war.		Moscow's public expressions of support for the DRV remained unchanged throughout the Congress.
2 April 1966: Minister of Defense Malinovskiy, in his speech before the Congress, stated, "The USSR has given and will continue to give selfless and resolute aid to heroic Vietnam in its just struggle."		Malinovskiy's routine report on the state of preparedness of the Soviet armed forces was moderate in tone and stressed the "defensive" character of the Soviet military.
4 April 1966: During his speech before the Congress General Aleksey Yepishev, political chief of the Soviet armed forces asserted that thousands of Russians, including "the personnel of whole military units," had volunteered to fight for the freedom of the Vietnamese people.		Occasionally during the past year various Soviet officials and propaganda organs have made references to alleged volunteers for the Vietnam war. Moscow appears to be primarily interested in the propaganda value of such statements particularly their utility in substantiating the USSR's "revolutionary character" in the face of Chinese charges of "capitulation."

Selected Soviet  
Public Statements

Selected Soviet  
Private Statements

Comments

5 April 1966: During his economic report to the Congress Premier Kosygin stated that "the international situation has been seriously complicated" lately because of the "aggressive war in Vietnam," and consequently the Soviet Government "had to increase defense expenditures." Later in his speech he added the Soviet Union "shall continue" to give the Vietnamese "assistance in the necessary proportions" until victory is achieved.

While the new economic plan does suggest there will be some increase in outlays on defense, there are apparently to be no major shifts in the allocation of resources for defense. Kosygin's comments on defense expenditures are similar to other references by Soviet leaders and seem to be particularly aimed at those susceptible to Chinese charges that Moscow's support of Vietnam is insufficient. In this connection the USSR would like to dramatize the impact the US involvement in Vietnam has had on the chances for a mutual reduction in defense budgets.

8 April 1966: The "Draft Declaration on Vietnam" was read to the Congress by Politburo member Suslov. It reiterated the well-worn Soviet theme that the USSR "has constantly rendered and is rendering the Vietnamese people large scale, all-round aid and support."

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Selected Chinese  
Public Statements

Selected Chinese  
Private Statements

Comments




6 April 1966: In a long editorial apparently prepared to appear at the same time as Peking's 400th serious warning to the US, the People's Daily declared that the US is preparing "to impose war on the Chinese people." Asserting that China must be prepared for a war to be fought "this year or next" as well as for one to be fought by the next or following generations, the editorial added that "it is the US imperialists and not we that want war." 

As has been the case with all Chinese public statements, the editorial implies that a Sino-US war would be caused by a US attack. 

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13 April 1966: Commenting on the shootdown of a US Navy KA-3B Skywarrior off the Liu-chow Peninsula on 12 April, the People's Daily declared that "We are well prepared for any provocations by the US imperialists. If they dare to come we will strike resolutely."



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COMMUNIST STATEMENTS ON NEGOTIATIONS IN VIETNAM

Selected Soviet Statements on Negotiations

<u>Selected Soviet Public Statements</u>	<u>Selected Soviet Private Statements</u>	<u>Comments</u>
2 April 1966: Foreign Minister Gromyko reaffirmed Moscow's familiar public position that the "program" of the DRV and the "platform" of the NFLSV is a "fair basis" for a settlement in Vietnam.		Gromyko broke no new ground in his relatively restrained exposition of the Soviet Union's "peaceful" and "disinterested" foreign policy--one of the main themes of the Congress.
8 April 1966: Politburo member Suslov, while reading the "Draft Declaration on Vietnam" to the Congress restated Moscow's standard position that, "the Vietnamese question can be resolved only on the basis of the recognition of the just demands of the DRV Government and the NFLSV."		Moscow's public position on this question remains unchanged.

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Selected Chinese Communist References to Negotiations

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Selected Chinese  
Public Statements

Selected Chinese  
Private Statements

Comments

9 April 1966: Liu Ning-yi,  
head of the Chinese dele-  
gation to the 21st na-  
tional conference of the  
Communist Party of New  
Zealand, declared at the  
conference that "the Chi-  
nese people firmly support  
the 4-point stand of the  
DRV and the 5-point state-  
ment of the Liberation  
Front." [REDACTED]

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Selected North Vietnamese References to Negotiations

Selected DRV  
Public Statements

Selected DRV  
Private Statements

Comments

30 March 1966: A Hanoi commentary on recent statements by Vice President Humphrey stated in part that "the only way for our people to save themselves is to raise up more strongly to engage in a life-or-death struggle against the US imperialists and to join the revolutionary forces in the rural areas in completely overthrowing the US recolonialists regime, chasing the US imperialists away from South Vietnam, establishing a coalition government, and achieving independence, democracy, peace, and neutrality, as outlined in the NFLSV's platform. This is the only correct way to end the present dark, life and achieve a bright future."

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31 March 1966: Hanoi radio rebroadcast Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev's remarks on Vietnam at the Soviet Party Congress. In part the broadcast quoted the Soviet leader as demanding that "the US imperialists stop the aggressive

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In recent weeks Hanoi and the Liberation Front in their propaganda have been mentioning the possibility of cooperation between the NVLSV and the various struggle groups participating in the current political unrest in South Vietnam. At the same time, both have continued to insist that any settlement of the war and future government in South Vietnam must be in accordance with the program of the Liberation Front.

Vietnamese statements on the proceedings at the Soviet Party Congress have naturally focused chiefly on statements and resolutions related to Vietnam. Hanoi propaganda on the congress and North Vietnamese officials involved in it generally

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Selected DRV  
Public Statements

Selected DRV  
Private Statements

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31 March 1966 Cont'd: war in Vietnam, withdraw US and satellite troops from South Vietnam, let the Vietnamese people settle their own affairs themselves, and accept the stands of the DRV Government and the NFLSV as a basis for the settlement of the Vietnam problem.

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attempted to stick to Vietnam related events and sought to avoid any controversy related to the Sino-Soviet dispute.

7 April 1966: Hanoi broadcast a lengthy editorial in the party theoretical journal Hoc Tap on the occasion of the first anniversary of the promulgation of the DRV four-point proposal for settling the Vietnam war. The editorial restated the original four points verbatim and declared that the four point are a package and cannot be separated. It declared that the US must accept these points and prove it by concrete deeds if there is going to be a settlement of the war.

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Hanoi's emphasis at this time on the fact that its position on settling the war has not changed one bit in the year since its four points were announced may in part have been directed to Peking as evidence of Hanoi's continuing determination to carry on the war and to the Liberation Front to shore up morale in the face of further US troop commitments.

8 April 1966: An article in the party daily Nhan Dan was voted to the first anniversary of the announcement of the DRV's four point proposal for settling the Vietnam war. The article, like an editorial in the party theoretical journal the previous day, focused on

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Selected DRV  
Public Statements

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8 April 1966 Cont'd: the contention that US refusal to accept point three of the program which calls for the settlement of the South Vietnamese problem without foreign interference and in accordance with the Liberation Front's program, would prevent any negotiated settlement.

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9 April 1966: In a broadcast on the US position on settling the war, Hanoi radio declared in part that: "The four-point stand of the DRV Government is the embodiment of the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Vietnam. It also took into account the situation which has developed in Vietnam and is a perfect answer to the deep aspirations of its people. It constitutes an adequate basis for a correct settlement of the Vietnam problem. It is a stand of peace."

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10 April 1966: An editorial in the Hanoi party daily, Nhan Dan, expressed sincere gratitude to the 23rd Congress of the CPSU for its wholehearted support for the Vietnamese people in their "just struggle against US aggression." The editorial recounted

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Selected DRV  
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10 April 1966 Cont'd: that the CPSU holds the view that the Vietnam question "can only be solved on the basis of the DRV and the NFLSV programs. It demanded that the US put an immediate end to the bombings of the DRV and to all other acts of aggression against it, that the armed forces of the US and its satellites be withdrawn from South Vietnam territory, that the NFLSV be recognized as the sole valid and legal representative of the South Vietnamese people, that the US Government stop interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam and strictly abide by the 1954 Geneva agreements."

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11 April 1966: In an interview with a Japanese correspondent on 14 March, broadcast on 11 April, Ho Chi Minh restated Hanoi's positions on settling the Vietnam war. In part he declared that in his letter of 24 January to heads of states he had expounded the "reasonable and logical stand of our government and people for a settlement of the Vietnam problem." This he stated, "is a correct stand for peace. Therefore, this stand is being approved and supported by the

The DRV president in similar interviews over the past year has repeatedly outlined the DRV's "just position" on settling the war to sympathetic journalists. Of late, he has use the language of his 24 January letter to heads of states as a statement of that "just position." In essence the letter contains a reiteration of the DRV's four-point proposal. In addition, the letter insisted that the US accept all four points and prove it by "concrete deeds."



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Selected DRV  
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11 April 1966 Cont'd: leaders,  
governments and peoples of an  
increasing number of countries."

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